Structural Preference Analysis and Utility Recovery#

This section delineates axiomatic tests for specific preference structures, including homotheticity, quasilinearity, and separability, as well as the formal methodology for utility recovery.

Homothetic Preferences (HARP)#

Reference Implementation: validate_proportional_scaling(log)

The Homothetic Axiom of Revealed Preference (HARP) evaluates whether an agent’s preferences are invariant to proportional scaling of income, implying that commodity demand scales linearly with total expenditure.

Formal Definition:

Define the expenditure ratio \(r_{ij}\) as the cost of bundle \(j\) evaluated at prices \(i\) relative to the actual expenditure at observation \(i\):

\[r_{ij} = \frac{p^i \cdot x^i}{p^i \cdot x^j}\]

The HARP Condition:

\[\text{HARP is satisfied} \iff \nexists \text{ cycle } i_1 \to i_2 \to \cdots \to i_m \to i_1 : \prod_{k=1}^{m} r_{i_k, i_{k+1}} > 1\]

Equivalently, in logarithmic space:

\[\sum_{k=1}^{m} \log r_{i_k, i_{k+1}} \leq 0\]

Reference: Varian (1983).

Quasilinear Utility (Income Invariance)#

Reference Implementation: test_income_invariance(log)

Quasilinearity implies a utility function of the form \(U(x, m) = v(x) + m\), where the demand for commodity \(x\) is independent of the agent’s income level \(m\). This is evaluated via the condition of cyclic monotonicity.

The Quasilinearity Condition:

For any sequence of observations forming a cycle \(i_1 \to i_2 \to \cdots \to i_m \to i_1\), the following must hold:

\[\sum_{k=1}^{m} p^{i_k} \cdot (x^{i_{k+1}} - x^{i_k}) \geq 0\]

Behavioral Interpretation:

A failure of quasilinearity suggests that the agent’s marginal utility of income is not constant, and choices are influenced by income effects rather than relative prices alone.

Reference: Rochet (1987).

Weak Separability (Feature Independence)#

Reference Implementation: test_feature_independence(log, group_a, group_b)

Weak separability posits that preferences over a subset of commodities (Group A) are independent of the consumption levels of another subset (Group B). Formally, \(U(x_A, x_B) = V(u_A(x_A), u_B(x_B))\).

Analytical Heuristic:

The implementation evaluates separability by examining the consistency (CCEI) of choices within partitioned commodity groups and assessing the degree of cross-group correlation.

Reference: Chambers & Echenique (2016).

Utility Recovery via Afriat’s Inequalities#

Reference Implementation: fit_latent_values(log)

If the observed data satisfy GARP, Afriat’s Theorem guarantees the existence of a continuous, monotonic, and concave utility function that rationalizes the behavior. PrefGraph recovers the latent utility values \(U_k\) and marginal utilities of income (Lagrange multipliers) \(\lambda_k > 0\).

Linear Programming Formulation:

The recovery is achieved by solving a system of Afriat inequalities for all observation pairs \((k, l)\):

\[U_k \leq U_l + \lambda_l \cdot p^l \cdot (x^k - x^l) \quad \forall \, k, l\]

Optimization Objective:

\[\min \sum_{k=1}^{T} \lambda_k\]

The resulting utility function is the lower envelope of the recovered tangent planes, providing a piecewise linear and concave approximation of the agent’s true preferences.

References: Afriat (1967), Varian (1982).